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Abstract: The social and legal practices of blaming, praising, punishing and rewarding 
are inextricably linked with the process of ‘holding responsible’. Blame, praise, and the 
like exist as means of holding agents to account that is distinct from, but reliant upon, 
attributions of responsible agency. When claims of accountability are made without 
access to an underlying shared attribution of responsibility, the communicative role of 
accountability is undermined. Disagreement over blame and praise is reduced to 
disparity: able to hear only that something is a bad or good thing, we are left unable to 
understand what the bad thing is, or why it is bad.  
Responsibility as we employ it offers the basis for our evaluations of agents. 
However, conceptions of responsibility that focus on agent capacities, namely control and 
rationality, fail to give responsibility a meaning capable of fulfilling this purpose. The 
retrospective responsibility of agents for events does not result from the capacities of 
those agents. It is attributed on the basis of agents’ roles in events, enabling 
accountability for those roles. 
 
Keywords: Responsibility, Blame, Punishment, Agency 
 
                                                        
* University of Exeter. 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of responsibility defines the conduct of human relationships. We employ 
responsibility as part of our social and legal practices, in the positive or negative 
positions we adopt towards other agents. Responsibility offers a means of holding others 
to account, through the communication of evaluative attitudes of blame and praise. 
Communicating these attitudes is fundamental to human interaction. However, such 
communicative practices cannot be based solely upon our relationships with one another. 
Accountability attitudes of blame and praise are a product of evaluative stances. 
They are defined by personal positions and values. If responsibility is to communicate 
attitudes of accountability, then it must retain its meaning across boundaries of evaluative 
disagreement. To survive disagreement, evaluative attitudes must be anchored in shared 
content, or else lose their meaning, and consequently, purpose. 
Accountability, in enabling the interaction of evaluation that is fundamental to 
human relationships, must be grounded in the shared reality that encompasses those 
relationships. The communication of accountability enables interaction between agents, 
but is enabled by those agents’ interaction with the world: by the relation between agents 
and events. It is in the need to encompass this relationship in responsibility practices that 
the role of attribution is found. 
Responsibility attributions describe the connection of agents to events. In doing 
so, they provide access to the shared reality that makes it possible to communicate 
attitudes across lines of evaluative disagreement. Responsibility attributions accompany 
accountability, as a necessary pre-requisite of our evaluative attitudes towards others. 
This purpose of responsibility has significant consequences for the requirements of its 
form. Any concept of responsibility must demarcate responsible agency prior to the 
ascription of blame and praise, by reference to transevaluative conditions of 
responsibility. If it is to do so, then it cannot depend upon evaluative positions, or lose its 
meaning when subjected to evaluative disagreement. 
Responsibility is often treated as a status attained by agents, and from this defined 
according to agent characteristics – commonly the possession of control or rationality. 
These approaches are incapable of satisfying the requirements of a responsibility that 
enables attitudes to traverse evaluative disagreement. In order to reach a responsibility 
concept that is functional in fulfilling both its purpose and meaning, there is a need to 
move away from understanding responsible agency as a matter of agents’ characteristics. 
Responsible agency results not from the capacities agents hold, but from their roles 
within events. By looking at chains of events and identifying responsible agents within 
them, accountability attitudes find meaning, and responsibility attributions purpose. 
 
2. Identifying responsibility’s purpose within social practice 
 
Responsibility just for its own sake is no responsibility at all. The practice of attributing 
responsibility always involves more than a simple claim that someone is responsible for 
something. It always involves an evaluation of an agent on the spectrum of blame and 
praise. In theory, one could imagine I might be held responsible for moving a pencil on 
my desk ten centimetres to the left. This would never occur, however, as there is no 
evaluation of me to be made on the basis of such normatively insignificant action.  
 Whenever responsibility is employed, it is because there is an evaluation of an 
agent to be made, such that the agent is held to account for the normative consequences 
of their behaviour. Responsibility statements are made only in situations in which they 
are normatively significant. We make attributions of responsibility because they are to be 
followed by an evaluation of the agent; if they were not then no attribution would be 
made. Responsibility is inherently normative, and coexists with evaluation. 
 From responsibility ensues evaluation, in the form of accountability attitudes on 
the spectrum of blame and praise. Responsibility, as practiced, is always connected with 
adopting an evaluative position towards agents.1 However, the normativity of 
responsibility statements does not imply that they vary with evaluative stances. It is a 
mistake to assume the possibility of meaningful communication across lines of evaluative 
disagreement in the absence of transevaluative, mutually understood content. In truth, the 
communication of evaluative attitudes between disagreeing parties is only possible when 
anchored by shared transevaluative understanding.  
  
A. Responsibility and evaluative attitudes 
When holding someone accountable, we make evaluative claims against them – we 
express attitudes. However, our evaluative claims are more than positive or negative 
attitudes, or statements of moral positions. Evaluations are accompanied, and supported, 
by references to content independent of our evaluative positions. This transevaluative 
content is essential to the communication of evaluative attitudes. 
Attitudes of accountability are central to human interaction. However, these 
relationships are frequently comprised of evaluative disagreement. By way of example, 
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we hold individuals accountable for being ‘terrorists’, to enable social blame and legal 
punishment, yet concepts like ‘terrorist’ do not exist unchallenged. Someone I call a 
terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter. We may perceive and describe exactly the 
same act, but evaluate it differently. 
To hold an agent accountable for terrorism is to adopt an evaluative position 
towards his behaviour. An evaluative stance on its own, without (implicit) reference 
elsewhere, does not permit the two notions of ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ to interact. 
There is nothing they share. It is only with some common frame of reference, allowing us 
to see what is being evaluated positively and negatively, that the two concepts can 
interact. We are only then able to delineate the content of our differing positions, such 
that we can see why our positions differ: not simply that they do differ. 
Accountability is concerned with human relationships, but cannot be fully 
explained by reference to those relationships. The relationship between two positions 
may be one of evaluative difference, which without anything further offers no means of 
communication. Accountability attitudes are in this way undermined, prevented from 
being communicated by their lack of meaning beyond their evaluative point of origin.  
In practice, we find that we can have different evaluative positions and still 
understand each other’s accountability attitudes. This is because we disagree within the 
context of a shared human reality: an existence in which relationships are formed not 
only between individuals, but between individuals and the world: between agents and 
events. This common relation to the world provides the frame of reference for our 
evaluative disagreements. Human experience is shared, such that whilst we may disagree 
over terrorism, we do so through concepts that form part of the concept of terrorism, such 
as swinging a knife, pushing a button, or pulling a trigger. Though these basic concepts 
may seem simple, and are easily taken for granted, they enable evaluation to retain its 
meaning. 
We might disagree over whether these things occurred; we might see them as 
differently motivated and thus different events; or we might evaluate them differently. 
All of these factors make up part of our contrasting attitudes of accountability. However, 
our evaluative disparity has expanded into disagreement. It is no longer a matter of two 
countervailing and irreconcilable positions. We have a reference point from which to 
understand the other evaluative position, from which to meaningfully disagree. We are 
able to determine whether we perceive the event differently, apply a different description 
to what we perceive, or evaluate our perceptions differently. Our countervailing 
evaluative attitudes become more than mere disparate opinions. 
Human experience provides the tools with which we can communicate 
accountability attitudes in the face of evaluative disagreement. Our shared existence 
provides not common meaning, but common understanding. Evaluative attitudes are 
subject to disagreement, rather than disparity. Reference to the interaction between agents 
and events allows accountability to inhabit its communicative role, as a means of 
conveying evaluative attitudes. 
A common relationship with the world gives meaning to our relationships with 
one another, making it possible for disagreeing parties to understand what it is that they 
are disagreeing about. This content exists beyond our evaluative stances, as an intrinsic 
component of human experience. Something when we communicate blame is providing 
access to this transevaluative content, ensuring the understanding of our accountability 
attitudes. It is here that we find the role of responsibility. 
Responsibility attributions persist across evaluative positions, remaining 
consistent across the spectrum of different attitudes. The praised or pardoned party is no 
less responsible than the guilty, though the attitudes that follow as consequences of their 
responsibility differ. Whilst their accountability changes, the accompanying attributions 
of responsibility do not. The alcoholic who cannot stop drinking and so is the subject of 
sympathy, and the friend whose lateness we have come to accept, are both still 
responsible for their behaviour. Our attitudes to them simply differ from those we would 
have towards a more deliberate drunk or a new acquaintance. There is a crucial difference 
between ‘not to blame’ and ‘not responsible’. Responsibility does not change with our 
evaluations. 
Attributions of responsibility describe agents’ relations to events. Without 
attribution, accountability attitudes lose their meaning across evaluative stances, and their 
purpose as a means of facilitating communication across those positions. When 
accompanied by responsibility attributions, evaluative attitudes can inhabit human 
relationships, enabling communication by reference to common human experience. 
Responsibility attributions, through their reference to shared reality and consequent 
independence from evaluative positions, provide the transevaluative content that makes 
accountability possible. 
 Responsibility and attitudes are both coexistent and co-dependent. The expression 
of attitudes through which we hold others accountable relies upon a transevaluative 
attribution of responsibility.2 Equally, however, responsibility is only attributed when 
there are attitudes to be expressed. The attribution of responsibility and expression of 
attitudes are mutually dependent. Responsibility attributions and accountability’s 
attitudes are distinct, but inseparable components of evaluative communication.  There is 
no responsibility without evaluative attitudes, and no accountability without 
responsibility attribution. 
Responsibility operates as the distinct transevaluative precursor for our evaluative 
attitudes. Responsibility attributions, as an unmoving counterpart to evaluative attitudes, 
provide access to the points of reference we rely on to engage in blame or praise. 
Whenever we blame or praise, we are using transevaluative attributions of responsibility 
to cross boundaries of evaluative disagreement. 
It is difficult to imagine a world without access to the shared transevaluative 
content of our disagreements. The notion that we could not communicate our shared 
human experience with others seems fanciful. That this is the case indicates how 
important responsibility attributions are, and how often they are being used to traverse the 
gaps between our evaluative positions. A pure evaluation of ‘freedom fighter’ competing 
with another of ‘terrorist’ offers no common concepts to form the basis of our evaluative 
claims. Both terms necessitate a means of filling the void of content. Responsibility 
performs this function, all the time, and is of vital importance within our communicative 
practices. 
By providing the agreed-upon content on which our attitudinal statements are 
implicitly based, responsibility enables attitudes, both negative and positive. Treating 
someone as responsible, recognising the extent of their responsibility, enables sympathy 
                                                        
2 Gary Watson, ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ (1996) 24 Philosophical Topics 227, 229. 
and praise. It allows us to pardon or forgive as well as blame and punish. In all of these 
cases, with the benefit of responsibility, we are able to demarcate the boundaries of our 
descriptive, perceptive, and evaluative differences. We can see the full picture of our 
disagreement, and understand what attitudinal claims we are making. Without 
responsibility, we would have no tool with which to access the shared content that 
enables communication across lines of disagreement. 
 
B. Framing responsibility’s form by reference to its function 
The transevaluative role of responsibility has significant implications for its necessary 
form. Responsibility must be determined by reference to common conceptions of agents’ 
relationship to the world, shared across evaluative stances, so as to remain the product of 
transevaluative content. Disagreements over the evaluations that follow responsibility, 
and over responsibility itself, are only made possible by reference to accepted basic 
concepts shared by disputants. Replacing these basic concepts with the products of 
evaluative positions would, in the absence of metaphysically true and universally 
accessible moral facts, introduce disparity into the content that must be shared if it is to 
provide the agreed-upon points of reference for our dispute. 
Though evaluative disagreement does not disprove the possibility of metaphysical 
moral objectivity, it does show that epistemological access to such truths is beyond the 
reach of disagreeing parties. If such access were possible, then there would be no 
disagreements to resolve. Moral facts cannot provide the transevaluative basis for 
evaluative disagreement. Dependence on evaluative positions offers no common content 
with which to communicate evaluative attitudes. Only reference to the shared experience 
of human reality can preserve the possibility of communicating accountability across 
evaluative boundaries. 
There are limits to the reach of shared understandings to which responsibility 
provides access. Some individuals will not apply these concepts, predominant across 
human experience though they may be. Thus, an individual may consider breaking a 
china plate to be a killing and an act of terrorism. That a small percentage of agents 
employ basic concepts distinct from those shared within the human community does not 
undermine that community. Some individuals operate outside of our shared experience 
and accepted understanding. They do not interact with other individuals, and with the 
world, in the same way. The end result is one that is common to many theories of 
responsibility: the responsibility of those who equate plate breaking to killing is denied 
by their mental disorder. 
Responsibility reaches only so far as our shared human experience, and there will 
be those who do not adopt the broadly accepted perceptions of sane individuals.3 They 
operate outside of the world we collectively inhabit, and consequently we lack the shared 
frame of reference needed to make sense of their evaluative position. We have lost the 
mode of communication with them that renders our responsibility attributions 
meaningful. We punish to deter or to scold, or praise to encourage, but never 
communicate, as this relies upon the common relationship to the world that exists as a 
key part of shared human experience. 
We rely upon a common reality to make sense of the attitudinal statements we 
make across lines of evaluative disagreement. Responsibility can provide a means of 
accessing these shared understandings. It allows access to the content understandable by 
                                                        
3 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press 1969), 204. 
both sides of an evaluative disagreement that permits those parties to understand and 
engage with each other. It can in this way keep us from talking past each other.4 
Responsibility is not evaluative, but is a necessary component of our evaluative attitudes. 
 
3. Identifying responsibility that enables attitudes 
 
Just as attitudes of blame and praise depend upon responsibility attributions in order to be 
understandable, our means of defining and demarcating responsibility must be able to 
explain the attitudes we adopt and practices we engage in. Responsibility must identify 
the distinction that is drawn between a domino that topples onto another and a human 
adult who knocks down a stranger. Equally, a concept of responsibility must not conflict 
with the distinctions we draw between an adult human’s intentional actions and an 
infant’s accidents. Crucially, it must explain why we make those distinctions by making 
reference to shared transevaluative content, thereby enabling disagreement over, and 
communication of, evaluative judgments of blameworthiness or guilt. 
 
A. Searching for the capacity to be responsible: control 
A common means of demarcating the boundaries of responsibility is to point to the 
capacities of the agents we are calling responsible. We seek to deny the responsibility of 
a range of causal agents: whether they are storms, trees, infants, or some non-human 
animals. These agents seem to lack certain capacities, and hence we point to the 
capacities absent in the non-responsible as grounds for responsibility. 
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One such capacity is control. If control is taken as a condition of responsibility, 
then we are responsible when we are in control of what we do.5 An agent’s responsibility 
may be made conditional upon that ‘person’s ability to control her mental states and 
events leading to action in the relevant causal way, such that she is able to perform 
actions freely and thereby cause events to occur.’6 On this account, when we lose control 
of ourselves or never had it in the first place, whether by reason of a magician’s hypnosis 
or physical incapacity, we are not responsible. However, when I choose to knock 
someone else over, I may be distinguished from a domino that uncontrollably topples into 
another, and can be deemed responsible. 
The control requirement imposes a threshold below which acts will be deemed 
outside the boundaries of responsibility. The exercise of control, as an element of moral 
agency, signifies the moral quality of, and agent’s responsibility for, the act in question.7 
It is this moral quality that gives rise to blame and praise.8 Whatever form control is 
required to take, it will always be a test of sufficiency, one that must be satisfied if acts 
are to be of the quality necessary for responsibility. 
The focus of discussion is typically concerned with the manner in which the 
control requirement should be framed: how control must be exercised in order for an 
agent to be deemed responsible.9  However, prior to the issues arising from the 
implementation of the control requirement is the challenge presented by the inherent 
dependence on evaluative judgments that results from determining the responsible quality 
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of acts on the basis of agents’ control. By failing to assess responsibility on basis of 
shared transevaluative content, introducing control as a condition of responsibility 
undermines the possibility of responsibility being used as a means to render evaluative 
attitudes understandable. 
Crucially, control is never absolute. If I attempt to fire a well-maintained gun and 
it misfires, then I remain responsible for pulling the trigger. However, my good fortune in 
this instance means no bullet left the chamber. External factors will almost always affect 
my acts, changing the outcome for better or worse. Controlled action is conditioned by 
this moral luck.10 Two drivers may be equally negligent, but that negligence may have 
substantially different consequences if only one suffers the misfortune of injuring a 
pedestrian.11 With so much occurring contemporaneously with our actions, there is no 
way we can be said to be in absolute control. 
We might, as some do, treat equally negligent drivers as equally responsible 
without regard to the consequences of that negligence.12 However, whilst it is possible to 
exclude clear cases of resultant luck, luck can never be excluded entirely from 
responsibility. Luck changes both the meaning and the consequences of individual acts. 
We can be highly influential, but our actions, both possible and realised, are conditioned 
by external contingencies that we can neither predict nor control. Our lives are governed 
by moral luck and the unpredictability of consequences.13 Requiring total control would 
undermine our responsibility, because we are never in control of the world; the 
                                                        
10 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge University Press 1981), 
21. 
11 Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2011), 251. 
12 Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 25. 
13 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 1998), 233. 
unexpected can always happen. If we were only responsible when we were in control, 
then we would never be responsible at all.14  
Total control cannot be required for responsibility, and the question then arises of 
the extent of luck, as a constraint on control, that still permits agency and responsibility 
to persist.15 If an individual is unfortunate enough to find himself suffering from 
borderline personality disorder, then we may disagree over whether that agent has control 
sufficient to imbue his acts with the quality of responsibility, depending on our evaluation 
of the effect on moral agency of constitutive luck that produces a genetic predisposition 
to BPD. I may give that agent’s condition significant weight, thus deeming them out of 
control and not responsible, whilst another considers genetic conditions not to undermine 
an agent’s control or the corresponding responsible quality of their acts. 
The assessment of control sufficient for responsibility must rely on some reason 
why that particular degree of control suffices. It does so because a judgment of 
accountability has been made. Rather than responsibility enabling evaluative attitudes, 
the expression of evaluative attitudes justifies responsibility. Attributions of 
responsibility are not made because something is a matter of evaluation, or of normative 
significance; instead responsibility only attaches when its subject matter is at a particular 
point on the scale of evaluative attitudes. An agent is responsible for something only in 
accordance with its particular evaluative weight. Responsibility attributions are made 
because what has happened has been evaluated. Responsibility is rendered dependent not 
just on the possibility of evaluation, but on the making of particular evaluations. 
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Using blame as an example, we might find fault with only some degrees of 
negligence, such that not all negligent drivers are equally responsible. Because 
responsibility is a condition of the evaluative judgment of fault, only culpably negligent 
drivers would be deemed responsible. Responsibility is thereby conditioned upon 
behaviour in relation to which control is deemed to exhibit a moral defect or proficiency, 
such that in the case of negligent drivers ‘we hold people responsible for exercising 
certain capacities of self-control that we (correctly or incorrectly) assume normal beings 
to possess.’16 
Conditioning responsibility upon moral evaluations provides means of setting 
boundaries of how much control is required for responsibility. Culpability is defeated by 
insufficiency of control. Any act that is beyond the control of the agent such that it does 
not warrant blame or praise is not the responsibility of that agent. Only the driver blamed 
for his negligence is responsible, because only he behaved in a substandard way.17 
Perhaps he paid less attention to the road, or the condition of his car, than we reasonably 
expected him to, and was therefore at fault. As a result, we hold him responsible. 
If moral evaluation is given the role of justifying responsibility attributions, it 
becomes the case that what we are responsible for is dependent upon what we are at fault 
for. Not just attitudes of accountability, but also attributions of responsibility, become a 
product of our evaluative stance. Our responsibility, as a consequence, is dependent upon 
evaluative positions. We lose the common ground between cultures that is essential to a 
purposeful concept of responsibility. Responsibility ceases to be a transevaluative 
concept, becoming one that is wholly reliant upon the evaluations made. If we are to 
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preserve responsibility across disagreement, a faulty agent’s responsibility should not 
differ from the perfect agent’s. Fault may be relevant to blame, but not to responsibility. 
When control is taken as the grounds of responsibility, responsibility is rendered 
dependent on evaluative judgments. The evaluation of what and how much luck is 
sufficient to undermine the responsible quality of an agent’s act determines whether or 
not that agent is understood as responsible. Responsibility thereby loses its 
transevaluative meaning. What results is the impossibility of access to shared human 
experience with which to make our evaluations. The purpose of responsibility is 
undermined when it is based upon a judgment of the existence of control.  
 
B. Alternate capacities: responsible when rational? 
We might instead try to equate responsible agency with rationality. Thus, when we are 
rational, we may be said to be responsible.18 However, if we are responsible, or 
particularly responsible, when we are rational, then the question of what reasons are right 
or best will determine our responsibility. Our status as rational is a product of the reasons 
we are deemed to have had: it is a product of an evaluative judgment, dependent upon an 
evaluative position. 
Responsibility is a means of enabling evaluation in the face of disagreement. It 
enables speakers to express evaluative attitudes in a way that the listener can understand, 
even across lines of evaluative disagreement. From responsibility having this function, of 
conveying the speaker’s position in an understandable way, it follows that responsibility 
is always communicated. If rationality is the basis of responsibility, then when 
attributions of responsibility are made, claims of rationality are also made.  
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The reasons that form part of responsibility attributions are both spoken and 
heard. Regardless of whether reasons justifying responsibility are understood as internal 
or external to the agent who holds them, they are always externally perceived.19 
Responsibility is not just held, but attributed. What matters for rationality, and therefore 
responsibility, is the external perception of reasons. The reasons relevant to responsibility 
are those perceived by the person who is making the responsibility attribution. 
Consequently, the primacy and adequacy of reasons are viewed from an external 
perspective. The rationality that determines responsibility will be a product of the values 
we apply in deciding what to perceive as reasons. 
When assessing what reasons someone had, we adopt evaluative stances. 
Therefore, when we make claims of rationality, we make evaluative claims. If 
responsibility is rationality, then claims of responsibility are evaluatively dependent. 
When we disagree using a rationality-based conception of responsibility, our 
responsibility attributions become subject to the same disparity as our evaluative 
attitudes. Imposing responsibility for rationality invokes claims of value that 
responsibility must supervene if it to provide a frame for understanding disagreement. 
Responsibility does not resolve disagreements between evaluative claims – it 
enables disagreement, by creating a context that makes evaluative attitudes 
understandable. In making evaluative claims we may disagree over matters of evaluation, 
perception, or description. We may also disagree over whether an agent is responsible. 
However, evaluative claims are not possible without a shared concept of what 
responsibility is.  A model of rational responsibility creates disagreement not just over the 
evaluations that accompany responsibility, but over the concept of responsibility itself. 
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When rationality is relied upon for responsibility, responsibility becomes a 
product of evaluative perspectives of what is rational, of what reasons an agent had, 
rather than our shared understanding of the world. We lose the function of responsibility 
as a tool for making sense of accountability attitudes, as it becomes dependent upon 
evaluative stances, not shared human experience. Responsibility loses its purpose as a 
means of enabling communication across evaluative disagreement. With standards of 
rationality dependent upon evaluative stances, a rationality-based responsibility reduces 
our blaming and praising attitudes to opposing non-interactive evaluations. Responsibility 
becomes dependent upon evaluative stances, rather than common human content, and 
ceases to be able to explain our blaming attitudes or our disagreements over blame. 
One possible avenue for avoiding this evaluative dependence is to seek to detach 
rationality from its connections with the right or wrong course of action. Raz’s approach 
is of this sort: an attempt to tie responsibility not to rational action, but to ‘rational 
functioning’, whether it is expressed through rational or irrational action. Raz’s position 
is defined by the Rational Functioning Principle (RFP), under which: 
 
‘Conduct for which we are (non-derivatively) responsible is conduct that is the 
result of the functioning, successful or failed, of our powers of rational agency, 
provided those powers were not suspended in a way affecting the action.’20 
 
 This approach looks to be premised not on rational failure or success, but on the 
exercise of rational capacities generally. Whether successful or not in the exercise of our 
rational capacities, ‘we are responsible for actions in virtue of their relationship to our 
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capacities of rational agency’.21 If this were the case, the RFP would avoid the challenges 
associated with holding agents responsible simply because they acted rationally, able to 
encompass within the bounds of responsibility actions regardless of whether a particular 
evaluative position deems them rational or irrational. On closer examination, however, it 
becomes clear that Raz’s principle fails to give meaning to responsibility and the 
evaluations that follow it. 
According to Raz, we are responsible for those omissions that result from a failure 
of our functioning as rational agents.22 A failure in rational functioning is not necessarily 
a failure to follow right reason, but a failure of the exercise of rational capacities: forming 
and executing intentions.23 It: 
 
is not success consisting in following right reason. It is the successful functioning 
of our capacities of rational agency. People often do what they should not do 
without their powers of rational agency malfunctioning. This, for example, can be 
the case when they have false, but rational, beliefs about what they ought to do.24 
  
A failure in rational functioning is not a failure to have or follow the reasons that 
are best. It is still a failure to follow reasons, but the reasons that matter are those the 
responsible person in fact has, rather than those a person ought to have. Raz contrasts 
failing to set the alarm clock (which I had reason to do this morning) with failing to call a 
random unknown person in Munich (which I did not have reason to do), noting our 
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responsibility only for the former.25 On Raz’s account, we are responsible for omissions 
only when the successful functioning of our rational powers would have resulted in us 
doing what we did not do. 
The dividing line for responsibility is not an evaluative question of what reason 
should be followed, but a descriptive one of what was followed – or not, as the case may 
be. The RFP functions without requiring evaluative agreement. Raz’s demarcation of 
responsibility avoids evaluative questions. However, the descriptive considerations it 
applies are, crucially, descriptions of a particular individual’s evaluative judgment.26 
Raz’s responsibility is not defined by reference to shared humanity, but to individual 
positions. 
For Raz, our responsibility depends upon whether our actions are expressions of 
rationality in following the reasons we have. The result is that responsibility for identical 
actions can differ between individuals, solely on the basis of their personal values. On 
Raz’s account, responsibility is the product of individual reasons. Responsibility is 
relative. 
The relativism of responsibility prevents it from ever enabling evaluative attitudes 
across disagreement. If I am talking of my own responsibility, or that of someone whose 
values I share, then I can work on the basis that I have a reason to set an alarm, and not to 
call Munich. Consider how the situation changes, though, if it is not my phone call to 
make, but that of Neville Chamberlain in the mid-1930s. A historian looking back might 
make the claim that Chamberlain should have made many more calls to Munich than he 
did, and may point to reasons why he should have done so. Yet Chamberlain did not 
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himself perceive those reasons, and has accordingly not failed in the functioning of his 
rational powers. As a result, on Raz’s account, he would not be responsible. In hindsight, 
there were reasons for him to act, but he was ignorant of those reasons. This ignorance 
absolves him of his responsibility. 
Not only Chamberlain’s blame, but his responsibility has been absolved by the 
different reasons adopted then and now. We may not blame Chamberlain, but his 
potential responsibility presents an altogether different question. When making 
attributions of responsibility, why should we be limited, as observers, by what the agent 
we are holding responsible knew? On Raz’s account, attributions of responsibility for 
omissions are rendered relative to the people they describe, and the context they are 
directed towards. 
Beyond omissions, further problems exist. Whether one succeeded or failed in 
one’s rational functioning will depend upon one’s reasons, and therefore one’s values. 
This is crucial because it is not the same to be responsible for our failures as it is to be 
responsible for that which is the product of our rational powers. Only in the latter case 
can we be deemed to have done something intentionally, for the levels of guidance and 
control that Raz deems necessary for intention are not compatible with rational failure.27 
Raz provides three conditions for control of an action: 
 
‘(1) either one performs it because one intends to do so, or one performs it, aware 
that one does so, by performing another action that one intends to perform; (2) the 
performance is guided by one’s intention and one’s beliefs, so that to the extent 
that one’s factual beliefs are true one does not, in performing the action, do 
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anything else that one believes one should not (on balance) do; (3) in so far as 
realization of the previous conditions depends on control of one’s body they are 
securely realized.’28 
 
All controlled actions must, on the above account, be either directly intended or 
the known consequence of an intended action. Not every rational failure is an 
unintentional action, but no rational success can result in unintentional action. As a result, 
whilst the boundary between controlled and uncontrolled action is not the difference 
between having right and wrong reasons, where that boundary lies will undoubtedly 
depend upon what an agent deemed themselves to have had reason to do. Under the RFP, 
the divide between intention and negligence is tied to the reasons of the potentially 
responsible agent. Whether someone is an intentional or accidental actor is a product of 
the reasons they had. This dependence on individual reasons relativises the boundary 
between intention and negligence, and has further consequences when taken together 
with Raz’s approach to responsibility for unintentional action. 
According to Raz: 
 
‘We are non-derivatively responsible for unintentional actions only if they are the 
results of a failed intentional action that falls within our domain of secure 
competence. Only then is the action due to a failure of our powers of rational 
agency, in the meaning of the principle.’29 
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In the absence of intention, the only difference between responsible action and 
irresponsible action is whether that action was the result of a failure of rational agency. 
To attract responsibility, unintentional action must be the product of what I had reason to 
do but failed to do. Whether something was a failure of my rational agency is contingent 
upon my values; the unintentional acts we can be responsible for are once again 
dependent upon the values we hold. Responsibility is once again relative. 
What we have reason to do is a product of our personal and cultural values. In 
relation to both actions and omissions, responsibility on Raz’s model depends upon 
whether our actions are expressions of rational functioning in following the reasons we 
have. Responsibility under the RFP can change depending on the values held by a 
potentially responsible individual, denying the responsibility of individuals not because 
they are less able to act rationally, but simply because our values differ to theirs. 
Responsibility for identical actions, or omissions, can differ between individuals. 
Responsibility under the RFP is relative: it changes between contexts and between 
individuals, such that the attitudinal statements it enables convey different things when 
applied to different people in different contexts. With the divergence of individual 
reasons comes the relativism of responsibility, and we are prevented from stating what 
someone is responsible for without reference to who they are and what is important to 
them. 
Rarely will we be able to fully describe the personal and cultural values of any 
individual. If I attempt to convey attitudes over any cultural or geographical distance, I 
am left unable to say what a Roman had reason to do in Ancient Rome and therefore 
incapable of describing their responsibility.30 Beyond the problem of distance, to the 
extent that personal reasons are self-created they are often beyond the perception and 
understanding of others. Attributions of responsibility are altered with differing reasons, 
whether these changes are the result of distance, or the uniqueness of individual values. 
Responsibility becomes a product of individual reasons, and changes for different 
individuals. There can be no standard of responsibility shared between individuals, as the 
possibility of attribution collapses into relativism. When responsibility loses its shared 
applicability, its loses not only its meaning, but also its purpose. If standards of 
responsibility become dependent upon individual and cultural values then responsibility 
ceases to enable evaluative attitudes. Responsibility for rational functioning removes the 
possibility of identifying the common transevaluative ground of our disagreements, by 
denying the existence of any common interaction with the world. Agents’ attributable 
relations to events, and consequently their responsibility, are rendered relative to reasons. 
The only possible escape from the relativism of responsibility is to incorporate the 
notion of objective rationality into the rational functioning principle. If inherent in 
rational success is according to an objective standard of rationality, then responsibility 
accords to this objective standard. By adopting this approach, we can remove the 
distinction between different kinds of failure noted above. We may also make the 
distinction between success and failure subject to the proviso that in order to succeed, one 
must follow objectively right reasons; this objective standard prevents variations across 
distance. 
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Through adding an objective standard of rationality to the criterion for 
responsibility, responsibility becomes dependent not just upon ‘the ability to realize the 
normative significance of the normative features of the world’, but also to ‘respond 
accordingly.’31 Agents are required to respond in accordance with their ‘understanding of 
concepts of true values.’32 An objective standard of rational functioning requires adoption 
of these true values, to the exclusion of defective ‘false values’.33 
Such an addition requires great confidence in realism, for it leaves responsibility 
dependent upon the existence of universal moral truths. It moves far beyond a standard 
realist account by declaring that universal values determine not only what I should do, 
but also what I can be considered to have done. Most problematically of all, it 
undermines the function of responsibility by denying the possibility of shared human 
experience enabling meaningful disagreement. If responsibility is determined by 
reference to rationality and true values determine rationality, then insofar as we share 
values, there is no evaluative disagreement for responsibility to enable. Where our values 
differ, there is no shared attributability that can establish a basis for our disagreement.  
In the cases where responsibility is needed – in instances of evaluative 
disagreement – it cannot function to enable disagreement. Instead, the introduction of true 
values denies disagreement. If two parties disagree over responsibility, then the party 
whose evaluative position accords best to true values has made the correct evaluation. 
There is no disagreement, only right and wrong evaluative positions. 
If we are to disagree over objective standards of reason, then we need access to 
those true values. Evaluative disagreement is possible only when we have perfect moral 
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knowledge. However, if we have such perfect knowledge then, by definition, our 
evaluations are not in competition, as they are both perfect: reflecting true moral values. 
There is no evaluative disagreement, and no function for responsibility to fulfill, because 
attitudes of accountability are already part of our universal consciousness. The extension 
of realism into the concept of responsibility can only dissolve the disagreements that 
responsibility enables.  Introducing true and false values to a concept of responsibility for 
rational functioning shields responsibility from relativism, but in doing so denies its 
purpose. 
Responsibility on Raz’s account enables the communication of attitudes across 
evaluative disagreements by basing responsibility not on evaluative questions of what an 
agent should do, but on the relation between their actions and what they would have done 
had their rational powers functioned properly. However, the resulting basis of 
responsibility – personal reasons – is not shared, but a set of personal and often 
unknowable considerations that vary with cultural context. The relativism of Raz’s 
responsibility renders the attitudes it enables meaningless. Appeal to true values to 
determine rationality offers no assistance. The impossibility of access to objective 
standards of reason makes any concept of responsibility defined by reference to them 
incomprehensible. 
Attributing responsibility on the basis of agent characteristics is deeply 
problematic. The demands of moral luck and reason force both control- and rationality-
based conceptions of responsibility into dependence on evaluative judgments and 
positions. Responsibility attributions lose the shared transevaluative content that allows 
us to make sense of our evaluative attitudes. A broader conception of responsibility as a 
product of rational functioning, whether successful or failed, looks to avoid evaluative 
dependence. However, adopting an agent’s reasons as the determinant of responsibility 
results in responsibility attributions that are relative to their subject, and equally 
meaningless, when travelling across evaluative disagreement. There is a need to identify 
alternative means of defining and demarcating responsibility. 
 
4. Redefining responsibility with a focus on events, not agents 
 
The approaches so far have treated responsibility as something agents attain. In 
identifying a concept of responsibility that can enable attitudes to travel across evaluative 
disagreement, it is necessary to look at responsibility from a different perspective. 
Responsibility need not be a product of something about a person that makes them 
responsible. It may instead be that something about certain events makes the people 
involved in them responsible. 
 
A. The responsible agency of intentional human actors 
A starting point for redefining responsibility is to look to the paradigm of responsibility: 
intentional adult human action. Intentional action by adult humans provides a framework 
of responsibility practices from which we can build a generalised concept of 
responsibility. 
When looking at an event, or events, intentional actors have a special role. 
Against a backdrop of other causes they are distinguished as actors. Just by being more 
than causes, actors establish their own intervention in the chain of causation, demarcating 
their presence within events.34 They do this simply because they become someone who 
did something. By acting, they become actors. 
Action transforms actors into more than mere causes. Action is elevated above 
causing, so actors are elevated above causes. In the context of a chain of causation – of 
causes – the actor becomes the start of something new within that chain.35 Their 
involvement in the chain does not follow on from previous causes, but represents a break 
in that chain. With this fresh start the actor in question becomes the origin of the 
consequence of their acts, whilst a mere cause cannot be responsible for consequences.36 
Action, the mere fact of it, says something about the actor: that they are distinct 
from causes such that we can deem them responsible agents in the context of events. 
Action is in this sense self-constitutive.37 Importantly, it is self-constitutive in front of an 
audience.38 Action, then, communicates to an audience. It does not necessarily express 
anything deeply-held or long-standing about the entity, but it does say that they, as an 
acting agent, took a special role by trumping causation. It communicates the entity’s 
special status as an agent. A dividing line can be seen between responsibility and non-
responsibility: the communication of agency.  
The distinction between action and causation is that the former, beyond merely 
saying what the actors have done, also says something about the actors themselves. It 
declares their status above the causal and marks them out as a particular sort of entity: as 
agents. Action declares the presence of an agent within events by holding up that agent as 
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someone, or something, with a particular role. It is this particular role that distinguishes 
us from dominoes and justifies the imposition of responsibility. Intentional human adult 
action represents the paradigm case of such responsible agency, but it does not 
encompass the whole of responsibility. 
 
B. Beyond intentional acts: the limits of agency 
In trying to develop a concept of responsibility we can think about other instances in 
which events are distinguished from mere causal occurrences. We can look to the first-
personal recognition of agency that is implicit in Williams’ concept of agent-regret. Only 
some events are such that agents can feel regret for being involved with them. Only some 
events are apt for Williams’ agent-regret.39 
Agent-regret is the emotion felt by those who feel a particular connection between 
their agency and events, such that the event is felt by the agent to be a product of their 
agency. Williams introduces the example of a lorry driver who cannot react in time to 
avoid the pedestrian who suddenly appears.40 Williams’ driver is not in control of his 
environment, nor is he necessarily rational, but feels regret that his agency is involved in 
the knocking-down of the pedestrian. The lorry driver’s reflection on events will be from 
a particular perspective, such that he: 
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‘will feel differently from any spectator, even a spectator next to him in the 
cab, except perhaps to the extent that the spectator takes on the thought that 
he himself might have prevented it, an agent’s thought.’41 
 
This particular reflection on events is agent-regret. 
Williams’ agent-regret is defined as the regret a person feels towards past events 
within which he is involved as an agent, regretting them as the products of his own 
action.42 It applies regardless of intention, for we can regret our own accidents just as 
much as our intentional doings. This, according to Williams, explains why a faultless 
lorry driver who runs over a child will always have a particular relation to those events, 
one that he would not have had if he were not the driver.43 Agent-regret connects agents 
to outcomes not merely as causes, but as participants. 
Williams’ truck driver feels regret not simply because he caused the accident, but 
because of his role in it as the driver. He did not have any control over the consequences 
of being a driver, or what it as a result meant to be a driver. What he did have was the 
space within events to have a role in the accident, to be a driver. Before events spiralled 
out of his control, the truck driver became, within the context of the accident, the driver 
of the truck. His identity, his role as a participant, was carved into the accident. As a 
result, ‘there is something special about his relation to this happening, something which 
cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault.’44 
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The fact of the driver feeling agent-regret is in part determined by his capacity for 
emotion. It is also dependent upon his values and perspectives; he may not see killing a 
pedestrian as something regretful. However, the question of whether he feels agent-regret 
is preceded by the distinct question of whether the accident was something about which 
he could feel agent-regret. This is a question that does not examine any internal 
characteristics or capacities of the driver, but instead examines the event as a whole, 
looking to the driver’s role. It asks whether this is an event that is apt for agent-regret. It 
was only with the particular relationship the driver had to events – that of a ‘doer’, in this 
case a ‘driver’ – that he was able to feel the particular form of regret that is agent-regret. 
It was only because of the nature of events that regret for being an agent involved in 
events became possible. 
Agents may often feel regret, but only feel agent-regret within a more limited set 
of circumstances. Williams’ driver feels agent-regret because he identifies as the ‘doer of 
the deed’.45 Had a different driver been in a cab without a wheel, careering out of control 
along the same road and hitting the same pedestrian, he may feel deep regret over being 
in the cab at that time, but this was not regret for being an agent involved in events. 
Rather, it was regret for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. An event such as this 
could not give rise to agent-regret, and there is a corresponding absence of any role for 
the driver in events. There was no space for agency, for becoming an agent was 
impossible in the absence of a steering wheel. 
At the point where the pedestrian stepped out onto the road, it became the case 
that the pedestrian would die. However, at the point Williams’ driver became a driver, at 
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the point he started driving, it was not pre-emptively the case that the pedestrian would 
die. Thus, whilst there was not space for the driver to change the outcome once he began 
driving, there was space for agency: for an individual to become the driver who killed the 
pedestrian. 
Only Williams’ driver could become a driver who later kills. By contrast, the 
wheel-less passenger could not be a passenger, or a driver, who later kills. There was no 
possibility for him to enter into the event as a participant; he never became more than a 
bystander. He was never in a position to have a role. It is not mere inevitability that is 
important here, but rather inevitability at the point of involvement of an agent. The role 
that binds us to events may not initially connect to the eventual consequence of our 
involvement. Our roles can change, and the removal of control from our hands does not 
undermine our changing roles: it can only prevent our initial introduction. Once 
introduced, we may be bound up in events but blameless because of an inability to 
change things. This is distinct, however, from situations in which we never have the 
opportunity to become bound up at all. 
 
C. From agency to responsible agents 
The relationship between agents and events need not be described by reference to agents’ 
control, or authorship, but instead the roles agents occupy within events.46 Responsibility 
attributions must describe our position in relation to events, but need not be defined by 
the manner in which we enacted or controlled those events. Agent-regret attaches to those 
consequences that we helped to bring about, regardless of whether we intended to do so, 
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whether the outcome was within our control, or whether we could have done anything 
different.47 Agent-regret is regret for being someone who has done something, for being 
an agent with a role. It is conditioned upon the position of an agent within events as a 
‘doer’, and it is only from this position that agent-regret (as distinguished from simple 
regret) is possible. This is another instance of the existence and inhabitation of an agent-
role, distinguishing events from mere causal occurrences. 
Implicit in agent-regret is the having of an ‘agent-role’ in events. Whilst the 
feeling of agent-regret depends upon our emotional perspectives and capacities, the 
possibility of agent-regret is a characteristic of events that indicates the existence of a 
space for agency. Whether agents have this space is a product of the events that occur 
around them: not of any rationality or control they themselves possess. The space for 
agency arises out of the way in which we describe events, such that they need a ‘doer’. 
When events, in the absence of that ‘doer’, would be causally under-determined, that doer 
inhabits the space for agency. They fill a gap that would otherwise exist within the causal 
chain, and in doing so take on a particular role as someone, rather than something, within 
a pattern of events. 
That agency is conditioned upon a ‘doer’ role does not imply a requirement of 
action as a condition of agency. It is quite possible to become someone who did 
something not by acting, but by failing to act. What matters is not action, but agency, 
which exists in a range of forms beyond the boundaries of intention and control. The 
inhabitation of an agent-role takes a range of forms, including omissions. 
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Agency expressed in terms of a position within events can ground our 
responsibility for the consequences of that position. Williams’ driver’s involvement in 
events was not merely causal.48 The possibility of agent-regret demarcates the driver’s 
relationship to what happened, as an agent. His interaction with the world enables our 
interaction with him, through the communication of evaluative attitudes. The driver may 
be deemed responsible for the pedestrian’s death, though of course this in no way implies 
his blameworthiness. Responsibility enables attitudes, not simply blame, and a 
responsibility attribution may lead us to provide a sympathetic, rather than outraged, 
response. 
Agent roles do not only enable agent-regret, but also establish our agency within 
events. The possibility of agent-regret supervenes particular evaluative stances, existing 
above and across evaluative disagreement. The connection between agents and events 
that establishes agent roles is part of, and defined by, our shared human experience. It is 
constructed from our common perception, grounded in the actuality of human experience, 
such that the boundaries of responsibility can be demarcated by the structure of our 
descriptions. 
Williams’ driver became bound up in events by becoming a driver. Responsibility 
is a product of his ‘doer’ status. The boundaries of responsibility are demarcated by the 
structure of our descriptions. When we move from speaking about causes to agent 
descriptions, and individuals are said to have driven, or hit, or killed, they are responsible 
as agents. They are drivers, or hitters, or killers, and responsible on that basis alone. They 
are to be distinguished from non-responsible individuals who may be no less helpless in 
controlling outcomes, but whose movements are the consequence of some outside force 
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that overcomes their agency, inhabiting the space they would otherwise take. When the 
space for agency is occupied or absent, we lose the ability to be responsible. When we 
have the space for agency, this implies our responsibility regardless of any rationality or 
control we may possess. 
The agent-role of agent-regret demonstrates agents’ capacities to make, be the 
subject of, and understand responsibility attributions – without requiring that responsible 
agents possess particular characteristics in order to do so. The space for agency arises 
simply because the description of events would be insufficient without the agent’s 
presence. Without agency, causation would be under-determined; there would be 
something missing. When agents occupy this space, they can be held responsible on the 
basis of the descriptions of the pattern of events around them. 
The possibility of agent-regret that accompanies such instances of responsible 
agency emphasises and enables the communicative role of responsibility. With the 
possibility of agent-regret comes the possibility of an agent understanding his or her own 
position within events. The first-personal self-reflection of agent-regret reveals the 
possibility of understanding attributions of responsible agency communicated by others. 
The capacity for understanding one’s own responsible agency is a consequence of the 
agency proscribed by the possibility of agent-regret, and it enables the shared 
understanding of attributions of responsibility. An agent with a role apt for agent-regret is 
not just as someone who as done something, but someone who can be the subject of 
responsibility attributions. 
Just as the space for agency permits us to engage in self-reflective agent-regret, so 
too does it allow us to express evaluative attitudes towards others, and to understand 
those attitudes when they are directed towards us. Responsibility framed as a counterpart 
to agent-regret captures the differing possibilities for adults, infants and dominoes to have 
roles and attract responsibility. It does so whilst fulfilling the function of responsibility, 
invoking shared transevaluative content and in doing so endowing us with the tools 
necessary to convey accountability across evaluative boundaries. 
Responsibility attributed on the basis of the possibility of agent-regret provides a 
shared, mutually understandable reference point for disagreement. This is responsibility 
that takes its justification from the particular role of the agent within events. Like events 
that result from intentional action, those that are apt for agent-regret demonstrate the 
special significance of the agent as something more than causal: as someone responsible. 
Such an approach recognises the evaluative significance of responsible agency, 
without resorting to evaluative dependence. The possibility of agent-regret is a product of 
the description of events, described in terms of shared basic concepts like driver, hitter, 
and killer. Agent-regret is a product of our shared human experience, arising out of 
common definitions and understanding. The space for agency exists because there is 
causal space for an agent to have a role. This role is constructed from transevaluative 
content, such that Williams’ truck driver’s plight may be understood from any evaluative 
perspective. We can attribute responsibility so long as we can convey to an agent their 
role as an agent; the limits of responsibility coincide with the possibility of 
communication of agency. 
Linking responsible agency to the rationality or control of the agents in question 
offers no satisfactory means of delineating the boundaries of responsible agency. The 
solution is to look not to the characteristics possessed by the agent, but instead to the 
character of the event they are involved in. It is to ask: was there space for agency? Was 
there space for someone to take a special status, or was this simply a case of x causing y 
causing z? Responsible agency exists where there is space, within the narrative of events, 
for such agency. Where agent-regret is possible, responsibility may be both 
communicated and understood. Responsibility can provide the shared transevaluative 
content needed to communicate evaluative attitudes. 
Responsibility does not in this way eliminate disagreement, or detach itself from 
evaluation. Responsibility attributions enable evaluative disagreement. They are a 
fundamental component of our evaluations, but crucially are transevaluative prerequisites 
of our attitudinal statements. They ensure that attitudes of accountability are 
understandable across boundaries of disagreement. Responsibility arising from the 
possibility of agent-regret offers a means of recognising the shared content of evaluative 
disagreements. 
Responsible agency is demarcated by the possibility of agent-regret. That an event 
is apt for agent-regret demonstrates the inhabitation of space for agency, such that we can 
become someone who did something, and the shared communicability of attributions of 
responsibility, such that we can become someone responsible for doing something. The 
possibility of self-reflective agent-regret enables the understanding of responsible agency. 
Responsibility attributions can be made, and accountability communicated, by reference 
to shared human experience. 
 
5. Responsibility reconsidered by reference to purpose 
 
The attitudes of accountability are fundamental to the relationships between agents. 
Responsibility is a means of grounding our attitudinal utterances in universally 
understandable attributions of agents’ relationships to events. When assessed against this 
aim, attempts to define responsibility by reference to capacities of rationality fail to 
capture responsibility without reliance on evaluative stances, defeating the purpose of 
responsibility and leaving the attitudes we express either incomprehensible or 
meaningless. Basing responsibility on control forces us to make judgments on how much, 
and what kind, of moral luck can be accepted. In doing so, it renders responsibility 
evaluatively dependent, undermining its function as a basis for our evaluations. A third 
approach is to look not to the capacities of agents, but to the roles they play. These roles 
carry inherent significance in demarcating agents as agents, distinguished from causes by 
having something said about them beyond simply what they have done. 
Agent roles justifying responsibility coincide with the possibility of agent-regret. 
They exist only within the space for agency, a characteristic of events – not agents – that 
allows for the introduction of an agent as more than a cause. Within this space we find 
responsibility unbridled by agent characteristics and disconnected from evaluative 
positions. With this meaning, we find responsibility with purpose. 
